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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
BABY GIRL MARIE, a person under
eighteen years of age;

Case No. 14599

NADINE MUNOZ,
Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

Appeal from Judgment of the First District Juvenile Court,
Weber County, The Honorable Charles E. Bradford presiding.

The Appellant, Nadine Munoz, by and through her attorney of
record James R. Hasenyager, hereby respectfully asks that Respondent's
Petition For Rehearing of the above-entitled cause of action be denied
for the reasons set out in Appellant's accompanying brief, herein
incorporated by reference.
WHEREFORE, Appellant asks that Respondent's Petition For
Rehearing be denied.

DATED t h i ss

//ffi

da

Y of A p r i l , 1977.

/JAMES R. HASENYAGER
A t t o r n e y for A p p e l l a n t
-iii

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT HAS BEEN AFFORDED A FAIR HEARING IN THIS CASE
BECAUSE THE COMPLETE RECORD WITH ACCOMPANYING BRIEFS OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES WAS BEFORE THE COURT AND THE ORAL ARGUMENT
ITSELF WAS PRESERVED ELECTRONICALLY.
Respondent asserts that it was improper for a successor Justice
who was not physically present at oral argument to participate in the
decision of this case. This assertion has two clear and fundamental
errors.
First, there has been no showing, nor even the allegation, that
the record before the court in this case was in any way inadequate or
incomplete as a basis upon which the court could make a review and render
its decision. Nor has there been a showing that any arguments or legal
propositions raised by either counsel in the oral argument itself were
not fully presented in the record or the respective briefs of the parties.
For review purposes, the record of prior judicial proceedings
along with the accompanying legal briefs of the respective parties are
the important items which the court reviews in reaching its decision of
any case. Indeed, it is recognized that when a complete record along
with the briefs of the parties are presented to the court for review,
oral arguments are generally not necessary.

Respondent's argument fails

in this respect because the full record, as well as legal briefs of the
parties were available for review by Mr. Justice Hall in reaching his
decision in this case.
-1-

The issue of a successor justice at the appellate level does
not present the problems traditionally associated with a successor judge
at the trial court level. There were no witnesses, no testimony to be
subjected to a credibility test, and no jury. Bangor and Aroostock Railroad Company vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive, Firemen and Engineers, 314
F. Supp. 352, at 355, 356 (1970).

In the instant case, with a full and

complete record before the court Mr. Justice Hall had the necessary
information upon which he could make his review and render his decision
in this case. The assertions of the respondent notwithstanding, review
is of necessity predicated almost exclusively on the record and briefs
filed with the court in a particular case. The respondent is in a very
shaky position asserting that it was prejudiced by the resignation of
Mr. Justice Henriod and the participation of Mr. Justice Hall in the
decision of this case. However, when coupled with the electronic recordation of the oral argument by the court itself, the respondent simply
has no position at all#
Oral argument was held on November 11, 1976, at which time
counsel for both the appellant and the respondent presented their cases
to the court. At that time, oral argument was recorded electronically
and a record of that session was preserved. The recording was in existence and available for rehearing if any members of the court later
desired to listen to that session.

Cases cited to the court by the

respondent are not only not on point to the issue raised by the respondent but are also forty years old as well.

Cordner v. Cordner, 64 P.2d

828, primarily relied on by respondent, is a 1937 case. It makes little
sense for the court to not recognize and incorporate into the efficient
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administration of its judicial business the accuracy and quality of modern electronic recordation equipment.

In the instant case a full and

complete record was before the court for review; the oral argument was
preserved and available for use by the court in reaching its decision;
the respondent's position is not well taken and should be rejected.

POINT II

IMPECUNIOSITY, ABSENT ADDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, WILL NOT
SUPPORT A DECREE OF TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER
SECTION 55-10-109, U.C.A. 1953, AS AMENDED.
Respondent has alleged that the court reached an improper conclusion of law when the court stated on page two of the original decision
that !lImpecuniosity will not support a termination decree." Respondent
further urges on the court the proposition that impecuniosity standing
alone will support a termination decree.

It is difficult to conceive a

position more violative of an individual's equal protection and due
process guarantees under both our Federal and State Constitutions. Contrary to respondent's assertions, this court has never taken the position
that impecuniosity absent other additional circumstances would support a
decree of termination.

In all of the cases cited to this court by the

respondent, indeed, in all of the cases decided by this court in which a
decree of termination was upheld, there were additional circumstances
which contributed to the termination decree to provide a totality of
circumstances warranting termination.

Those additional circumstances

have included emotional instability of the parent, In re State in the
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Interest of Jennings, 20 Ut. 2d 50, 432 P.2d 879 (1967); a killing of
the mother by the father in the presence of the children, In re State in
the Interest of Mullins, 29 Ut. 2d 376, 510 P.2d 720 (1973); inadequate
parental supervisory skills, poor housekeeping and low moral standards
of the mother, State in the Interest of T. G., 532 P.2d 997 (1975); abandonment, State in the Interest of Summers Children, 560 P.2d 331 (1977);
and, where the home was clearly inadequate and the parents could not or
would not correct the evils which existed in the home, Inez Pilling et
al vs. Donna Lance, 23 Ut£d 407, 464 P.2d 395 (1970).

Not a single case

supports the position of the respondent. As this court properly pointed
out, impecuniosity, standing alone, will at best support only a finding
of dependency before the juvenile court. In the instant case, none of
these additional circumstances were present.
Respondent has conveniently chosen to ignore a central fact of
this case in that the appellant was a juvenile at the time of the original termination decree and was impecunious only because of the temporary
status in being a juvenile. This type of disability, not of the appellants making and the only one present in this case, is alleviated very
simply through the passage of a short period of time; a circumstance
which had been adequately met by the Juvenile Court's original order of
November 6, 1974, placing the child in the temporary custody of the
Department of Family Services with review in one year.
It would be a major step backwards in the development of the
law of this State if this court were to reverse its original holding that
11

Impecuniosity will not support a termination decree.11 Appellant urges
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the court to categorically reject the proposition that impecuniosity
absent other circumstances will support a termination decree,

POINT III

DISSATISFACTION WITH THE COURT'S HOLDING IS NOT A PROPER
BASIS TO SEEK A

REHEARING AND RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR

REHEARING SHOULD BE DENIED.
The essence of respondent's final argument is that the respondent is not satisfied with the court's conclusion in its original decision. Respondent has asserted that the court failed to consider the
issues raised by Points I and VI of respondent's original brief: to-wit,
that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to vacate its previously
entered order and that the welfare of the child and findings of the
juvenile court in relation thereto are of paramount consideration on
review by this court. However, respondent ignores the holding of this
court in its original decision of February 24, 1977, that the juvenile
court lacked the jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of the
appellant in the first place; that the juvenile court, a statutory court
of limited jurisdiction, may only terminate a person's parental rights
when it strictly follows fla clearly expressed statutory standard,,! Decision, February 24, 1977, page 3; and that the original order of the
juvenile court in this matter was void. Respondent appears to be suggesting that no matter how carelessly and error-ridden a juvenile court's
initial termination proceeding may be, if the State or adoption agency
can act quickly enough in bringing the matter before the district court
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on an adoption action, that all prior defects committed by the juvenile
court in the original termination are cured.

Clearly, the law will not

sustain such a position, and of equal clarity is that this court has not
ignored Point I of respondents initial brief.
On the issue of an intervening adoption proceeding, the majority opinion notes in footnote number 2, page 3 of the original decision
filed February 24, 1977:
2. Also see 46 Am. Jur.2d, Judgments, Section 752,
P. 915: ,f. . . the defense of laches has been
regarded as not available against a motion to
open or vacate a void judgment, for the reason
that no amount of acquiescense can make it
valid . . . . There may be some instances, however, under which laches or delay may be asserted
to preclude relief, as where others innocently
relied on the record of the judgment.
Additionally, the last paragraph of the majority opinion expresses the
recognition by the majority that this case was not an easy decision to
be made in light of the personal interest involved.

There the court cor-

rectly characterized the original error-ridden termination proceeding as
!l

a tragic example which results from a failure to adhere to a clearly

expressed statutory standard.If

Decision, February 24, 1977, page 3.

Clearly, the court in reaching its decision in this case did consider
the personal interests involved.
Point III of respondent's petition for a rehearing is in substance an emotional appeal grounded upon dissatisfaction with the courtfs
conclusion.

Such an argument does not meet the standard for a rehearing

set out by the court in the old case of In re McKnight, 4 Ut. 237, 9 P.
299 (1886) or that of Brown v. Pickard, 4 Ut. 292, 11 P. 512 wherein the
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court stated:
The appellant moves for a rehearing. He alleges
that . . . the court erred in its conclusions.
Nothing is now submitted as a reason why a rehearing should be granted that was not fully considered
in the argument. No showing is made that satisfies
the court that it should review its conclusions,
and we are not convinced that we erred. We long
ago laid down the rule that, to justify a rehearing,
a strong case must be made. We must be convinced
that the court failed to consider some material
point in the case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or that some matter has been discovered which
was unknown at the time of hearing. Venard v. Old
Hickory M & S. Co.,7 Pac. Rep. 408. Where a case
has been fully and fairly considered in all its bearings, a rehearing will be denied. People v. Rogerson,
7 Pac, Rep. 410.
All of the issues raised by respondent in Point III of their petition for
rehearing were before the court in its original decision, were considered
by the court in its original decision, and respondents petition should
therefore be denied. Arguments presented by respondent are in effect reargument of respondents original brief. When this is the case, the
petition should properly be denied. Dredge Corp. v. Husite Co., 369 P.2d
676.
POINT IV
RESPONDENT HAS INCLUDED IMPROPER STATEMENTS IN ITS BRIEF
WHICH SHOULD BE STRICKEN.
Appellant takes exception to, as improperly included in respondent's brief on petition for rehearing, the reference to a March 4, 1977,
letter to the Salt Lake Tribune from a child psychiatrist quoted in respondent's brief for a rehearing. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing,
page 18. Appellant asserts that it is in effect an attempt to influence
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the court through the introduction of what the respondent is obviously
characterizing as expert testimony.

Such an attempt is improper as

review is predicated upon the record of this case as previously established, not upon an opinion generated outside the judicial process, and
this reference should be stricken from respondents brief.
Lastly, appellant asks that the first sentence of repondentfs
conclusion, Respondents Petition for Rehearing, page 19, be stricken
as well.

This is not legal argument proper for consideration by the

court in a petition for rehearing, rather it is an attempt at an inflammatory emotional appeal directed solely at dissatisfaction with the
court?s original decision.

CONCLUSION

Appellant submits that the respondent has been afforded a
fair hearing in the decision of this case; that the court has not erred
as to either fact or conclusions of law; and that respondent's petition
is based solely upon dissatisfaction with the conclusion of the court1s
original decision. All issues raised by the respondent were considered
by the court in its original determination.
Therefore, appellant respectfully asks that respondent's
petition for rehearing be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES R. HASENYAGER
Attorney for Appellant

-8-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify two copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN
ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING were mailed this
day of April, 1977, to:

6<Q

Franklyn B. Matheson
Assistant Attorney General
(Attorney for Respondent)
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

LS

'AMES R. HASENYAGER

